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ABSTRACT
In an economy without public goods, competitive equilibrium and Shapley
value agree. We show that for an economy with a single public good, Lindahl
equilibrium and Shapley value need not agree. Thus, the question of whether
Lindahl equilibrium represents the positive solution to the problem of just
taxation remains open.
1. Introduction
In an economy, there are essentially three approaches to the problem
of value and distribution: pure competition (competitive equilibriuBi),
coalitional power (the core), and fair division (the Shapley value) [5].
In an economy without public goods but with a continuum of agents, all
three approaches are equivalent, in the sense that they lead to the same
allocation of goods and the same imputation of utility [1, 2]. For an
economy with public goods, competitive equilibrium is replaced by the
analogous concept of Lindahl equilibrium, the other approaches remaining
the same. For an economy with a continuum of agents and a single public
good, Muench [A] has shown that Lindahl equilibrium and the core are not
equivalent. Muench's counterexample also shows that the Shapley value
and the core are not equivalent; however, the Lindahl equilibrium and the
Shapley value are equal in the economy he studied. The purpose of this
paper is to break this final equivalence: we will show that, in general, the
Shapley value and the Lindahl equilibrium are not equal.
We pursue this purpose in the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2
recalls and extends the economy studied by Muench. We retain a non-atomic
measure space of agents, linear technology, and transferable utility. We
generalize the form of the utility function, and Introduce two classes of
agents, distinguished by their initial endowments of the private good.
Lindahl equilibrium for this class of economies is computed in section 3.
We state and solve the coalition production problem in section 4. There we
also show that the Shapley value can be computed using the diagonal formula
of Aumann-Shapley [2]. Section 5 gives necessary and sufficient conditions
for the equivalence of Shapley value and Lindahl equilibrium, which themselves
lead directly to an argument for a class of counterexamples. An explicit
counterexample is presented in the last section.
There is one startling aspect of this result: Lindahl, although drawing
his equilibrium concept by analogy from competitive equilibrium, claimed that
it gave the positive solution to the problem of just taxation [3]. However,
if the Shapley value accords with our principles of the fair division of
taxes, Lindahl''s claim cannot be maintained.
2. The Model Economy
The notation for the model follows Muench [4]. We quickly recall that
notation, at the same time extending his situation.
Our model economy is as follows:
(1) Ameasure space of agents (T,^^, L), where T= [0, ll^^is the
class of Lebesgue measurable subsets of T, and L is Lebesgue measure. We
shall interpret a point t eTas an economic agent, and a set S kJ? as an
economic coalition.
(2) A consumption set for each agent consisting of the non-negative
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orthant of E .
(3) A utility function for each agent of the form
uCx, y(t)) = y(t)fj^(x) +
X represents the public good; y, the private good, f^ and f^ are concave,
increasing, non-negative functions with many derivatives (denoted ^2^*9
f^"'); f2(0) = 0. For instance, Muench takes = !•
(4) An initial endowment of resources, y(t) in the private good, with
It 7(t) =1
(5) Avector measure y, = (g^, defined on
^.(S) - = (L(S), Jg y(t)dt)
Intuitively, measures how big a coalition is, and ^2 measures how much
resources a coalition commands.
(6) Two disjoint endowment classes, A and B which exhaust T.
We let y(t) = y^, teA
^yfa. teB.
No generality is lost by letting A = [0, 1/2), B = [1/2, 1], y > y, .
a D
Xhas, 1 = y(L) = Ja y(c) + Jg y(t) = y^u^(A) + y^n^(B) = <J^ +
Informally, A represents the class of the rich; B, the class of the poor.
(7) Production possibilities, available to any coalition, of the form
X + a(y(S) - J(S)) ^ 0, where
y(s) =JgyCt), y(s) =
To assure the presence of both the private and the public good in the economy,
we require that
af*(0) + f^(0) ^ f^(a)
" £[(0) < " I < •
In other words, the marginal rate of transformation of y for x lies between
the marginal rates of substitution at the points (x, y) = (0, 1) and (a, 0).
One feature worth stressing about the model is that it gives rise to a
transferable utility. Given any level of production of the public good, utility
is an affine function of the private good. Thus, the private good is the medium
for transferring utility.
83. The Lindahl Equilibrium
To define Lindahl equilibrium, we introduce the integrable function
q: T -• E-t, For any coalition S,
q(S) =
We adopt the normalization q(T) =1, An immediate implication of (7) and (8)
then is that the price of the private good is a.
Definition. A Lindahl equilibrium is a (price, allocation) pair
(q*(t), (X*, y*(t)) if
(a) the allocation is feasible, that is
a
q(t) represents the price of the public good.
^yA(t) + X* =
(b) (x*, y*(t)) maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint
q*(t) X -H a y(t) = a y(t), for all tgT
(c) (x*, y*(T)) maximizes profits, that is
x q*(T) + a(y(T) - y*(T)) is a maximum
Proposition 1. There exists a unique Lindahl equilibrium, satisfying
y(A)f(x*) + l/2f'(x*) 7(A)f'(x*) + l/2f'(x*)(i) q*(A) = x*f^(x*) +f^(x*) ' " x*fj(x*) +f^(x*)
y(A)f (x*) - x*/2 f'(x*) y(B)f-(x*) - x*/2 f*(x*)
= f^(x.) +x^f-(x^) ' = fjcx^) x^f;(x')
(iii) q*(A) + q*(B) = 1
(iv) y*(A) + y*(B) ^ y*(T)
y*(T)f'(x*) + fi(x*) ^
(v) = - ^^ ^ f^Cx*) a
Proof. It is easy to show that (i)-(v) determine a Lindahl equilibrium and
this is left to the reader.
To establish uniqueness, one considers the maximization problem that the
coalition of all agents, T, faces, namely
max ^y(t)f^(x) + f2(x) = max y(T)f^(X) -f
s. t. X + a .^yCt) = a ^y(t) = a.
Along an indifference curve, the marginal rate of substitution
^ yf' + f^
- —£ < 0 (suppressing the argument for f^^, f^)
clearly from (3). Further the marginal rate of substitution is diminishing,
since
d^ f,(yf," ^ f/) - 2(yf^- ^ £^-)f|
dx^ (f^)^
again using (3). Thus given (8), (v) is satisfied by a unique (y*(T), x*).
Hence the solution (i)-(iv) is unique.
The symmetry inherent in Lindahl equilibrium makes it clear that all
individuals of the same income class will be charged the same price for the
public good, i.e.
q*(A) =J^q*(s) =q*J^
In other words, the Lindahl equilibrium of the measure space economy simply
makes uniform distributions out of the Lindahl equilibrium of the economy
consisting of the two "atoms", A and B.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is that all Pareto-optima—in
particular the Shapley value--must produce the same amount of the public
good, x*.
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4. Coalition Production and the Shapley Value
To apply a game-theoretic solution concept like the Shapley value to
the economic situation we envision, we must first evaluate the power of
each possible coalition. This power, measured by the characteristic
function, v(S), a map from ^ to the reals, represents the optimal solution
to the coalition production problem (9):
max jgy(t)f^(x) + f^Cx)
r r -s.t. X+ ajgy(t) £ ajsy(t)
v(S), then, equals the value of the maxiraand. In economic terms, a coalition
is deciding how much of the public good it can afford to produce, assuming
that the rest of the economy consists of free-riders; the characteristic
function then equals the utility which that coalition can produce for itself.
Rewriting the coalition production problem as
max y(S)f^(x) + p,^(S)f2(X)
(9')
s.t. X + ay(S) ^
shows clearly how its solution depends on the size of the coalition,
and the resources It commands,
For the coalition of all agents, T, (8) guarantees an interior solution
to the coalition production problem. Much stronger is the requirement that (8)
hold for every coalition: that is, for every S such that
ay,2(S)f '(0) + n (S)f '(0) (S)f/(ap, (S))
VO) < - Z< - f,(a,2(S)) -
There are functions which satisfy (8')--for instance, fj^(x) = x, = 0--
but instead we shall allow corner, as well as interior, solutions to the coali
tion production problem.
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Proposition 2, v(S) is given by
yi2(S)fj^(0) if only y is produced by S
lj,j^(S)f2(ay,2(S)) if only x is produced by S
f, (x) - (S)f2* (x)
^ > f 1(x) + y,-(S)£„'(x) if both X and y are producedi i / g_
Proof. The first two cases are clear, given (9'). The third follows by
substituting the first order condition for a maximum, namely
lj.^(S)f2*(x) + y(S)f^'(x) - fj^ = 0 (11)
into the utility function.
Notice that v(S) can be written in the form fO|j,(S); that is, the power
of a coalition is some function f of both its size and its resources. It is
also worth noting that one has here a coalition production economy in the
sense of Sondermann [6], Sondermann notes that for general coalition production
economies, the existence of the Shapley value is an open question. However,
for characteristic functions of the form v = fog,, Aumann and Shapley have
answered the existence question [2, Theorem B]:
Let be a vector of nonatomic measures, and let f be continuously
differentiable on the range of y,, with f(0) = 0. Then there is a
unique value cp $ given by
cp(£on)(S) = £p,(s) (sp,(I))ds (12)
where fy,(S) is the derivative of f in the direction p,(S),
To check that the theorem applies, we note first of all that coalitions
with 0 resources and 0 members produce 0 utility. As long as both goods are
being produced, the differentiability of v (hence of f) is assured by the
differentiability of f^^ and f^. The only thing left to check is the differ
entiability of v when a coalition is on the verge of switching from corner to
interior production. We study this situation by computing the necessary
partial derivatives.
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Proposition 3. The partial derivatives of v with respect to and
given by
c)v Sv
SyT" ~ ^ if only y is produced
^ produced (13)
= f2(x) = fj^(x) if both Xand y are produced,
Proof, The first two cases follow directly from (10). It is,more convenient
to derive the third case from a relationship equivalent to (10)
a^„(S) - xf (x)
v(S) =^^(S)f2(x) + i
Differentiating and collecting terms, one has
- V = ^2
Si = - ^x) =
making use also of (11), i
Proposition 4. v is differentiable on the range of |i.
Proof. Consider first the case when exclusive production of y gives way to
production of both x and y. In this case, using (3) one has
lim hv _ 1 . r / N /s civ
x-0 h\i " 2 - 0 - ^— when only y is produced
x-0 "i^l
x-O hu, ~ ^2^^^ ~ ^9^^) ~ >,T when only y is produced.
^2 x-O oM"?
Similarly, for the second case, when exclusive production of x gives way to
production of both x and y.
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"1^ ^ produced.
y^ 1^ = - y)) =^i<^2^ "1^ produced.2 y~^ 1
since on the boundary it is the case that
_1 ^ _^^1^2'^ ^2^
" a " "
Thus, in every case the differentiability of v is assured, and hence the cited
theorem of Aumanii and Shapley applies.
Applying (12) to the present situation, one has that
tp(fon)'(S) =M.i(S)JJ |j^(s, s)ds +U,2(S)jJ (s, s)ds (14)
One noteworthy aspect of (14) is that the Shapley value is completely determined
by the behavior of v along the main diagonal of the vector measure (see
Figure I), that is, along the set of coalitions -^S: |j,(S) = (s, s) 0 ^ s ^ 1_" .
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Figure I, The Range of p,
(1/2, y(A))
(1/2, y(B))
- area where corner production takes place
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5. CcMnparison of Shapley value and Lindahl equilibrium
In this section we investigate the equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium
and Shapley value.
Proposition 5. Suppose every coalition produces both x and y. Then Shapley
value is equivalent to Lindahl equilibrium if and only if
(15)
1 x*f 72
0 =^2 • ^ x*f '^ ^
all functions on the right being evaluated at x*(l, 1) »
Proof. Using (14), (10), (6), and the hypothesis of interior production, one
has
1/2
1/2
y(A)
y(B)
Q f2(x*(s, s))ds
nQf^(x*(8, s))ds
cp (v) (A)
cp (v) (A)
(16)
From proposition 1, one has that the Lindahl imputations of utility to set A
and B are
Lindahl (A)
Lindahl (B)
y(A)f^ - x*f2'/2
^*^l' ^ ^1
y(B)f^ - x^f272
(17)
The Lindahl and Shapley imputations are equivalent if and only if the left-hand
side of (16) and the right-hand side of (17) agree. Solving the resulting set
of equations leads immediately to (15).
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The reader can easily check that the following functions satisfy (15):
(f^, f^) = c)i where c is a constant
1^1 ,
(fl, f^) = (fj, , as long as f^requires everywhere interior production.
Another class of functions for which equivalence can be established is that
considered by Muench, namely
I
(f^, f^) = (1, f^)'
In this case, small coalitions will not find it profitable to produce the public
good.
I
Proposition 6. For the Muench economies, the Shapley value and the Lindahl
equilibrium are equivalent.
I
Proof. In this case, the right-hand side of (17) simplifies to
y(A) - -^+ X
^*^2' ^2y(BX 2—2
From (13), (14), and (16) it is easy to see that
1/2
1/2
y(A)
y(B)
f2(x*(s, s))ds
n
0
1 ds
cp (v) (A)
cp(v)(B)
(17')
(16')
where (s*, s*). is the point on the main diagonal where the production of both
goods begins.
By Pareto-efficiency, Lindahl (A) + Lindahl (B) = cp(v)(A) + 9 (v)(B).
This, in light of (16') and (17'), implies that
Is* " ^2 ' ^*^2''
From this it is easy to see that Lindahl equilibrium and Shapley value agree.
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Propositions 5 and 6 might lead one to believe that the equivalence
between Lindahl equilibrium and Shapley value was a general phenomenon. To
I I
see that this is not so, consider the case where
(f^, f^) = (x, f^).
Assuming interior production for the time being, (15) requires that
jj x*(s, s)ds =x*(l, l)/2 (15*)
Now we can analyze the behavior of x*(s, s) along the main diagonal by sub
stituting in (11) the values (s, s) for (y,, ^"2)*
s(af2* + f^V) - x*(s, s) f^' - f^ = 0. (11')
Further substituting f^ = x, one has
s(af2' + 1) - 2x*(s, s) = 0.
Differentiating twice, one sees that x'^(s, s) is an increasing function of s,
and strictly concave as long as f^"' > 0, This means that the equality (15')
cannot hold. Indeed, for all such the Shapley value of the rich, cp (v) (A)
will be greater than their Lindahl imputation.
18
6. Counterexample
1/2
For an explicit counterexample, we take (f , f.) = (x, x ), a = 1,
^ 1
y(A) = 3/4, y(B) = 1/4. The production of the public good along the main
diagonal, x*(s, s) is given by
x*(s, s) = s when s ^ 1/4
s(l/2x*^^^ + 1) = 2x* when s > 1/4
In particular, at values of s less than .25, all production goes to the public
good. Table 1 takes a closer look at the behavior of x*(s, s). Notice that
x^ is increasing and concave in the range where both goods are produped.
However, the concavity is so mild that the line through the points (s, x*(s, s))
(.25, .25) and (1, .7826) given by
x*(s, s) = ,7101s + .0725
is fairly close to the true value of x*(s, s), although a consistent under
estimate.
Since no private good is produced at s below .25, the test corresponding
to (15') is now whether
(•1 (s s-jds = x*(i, 1)
,0 ^ 2
Sv s £ .25where ®— (s, s) = i^^2 ^x*(s, s) s>.25
A lower bound on the intergral is
y'' >/7/2 ds +
JO
which is clearly greater than .7826/2 = ,3913.
Using Proposition 1, one calculates that Lindahl equilibrium imputes the
utility .625 to the set A, the utility .430 to the set B.
n
.7101s + .0725 ds = .4288
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Table I, x* along the main diagonal
s x*(s, s) .7101s + .0725
0 0
.1 .1
.2 .2
.25 .25 .250
,314 .3 .295
.447 .4 .390
.586 .5 .488
.729 .6 .590
.878 .7 .696
1 .7826 .7826
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On Che contrary, a lower bound on Che uCiliCy chat the Shapley value
imputes Co the set A is .635. To see this, we note that
1.055 = v(T) = tp(v)(A) + cp(v)(B) =
Since a lower bound on the first integral is .429, an upper bound on the
second is ,626, Thus, from (14),
cp(v)(A) > (,75)(.429) + (.5)(.626) = .635.
n s)ds + s)ds0 c)fi2 Jo
21
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